Abstract: In this paper, in order to answer the question: "In an industry where imitation by competitors is easy, how has differentiation between companies been created and maintained?" we provide a new framework, based on the Dynamic Capability-Based View of the Firm and Action System Theory. On the basis of this framework, we analyze the early stages of competition in the online securities industry in Japan. We found that when a Dominant Perception created in an industry is strengthened by the actions of companies, the strategy of a successful company may not be imitated for several years and consequently that an expansion in differentiation between companies may occur.
Introduction
Why does differentiation among companies arise and persist in an industry where imitation is easy? In the online securities industry, 1 business is basically 1 Online security company in this paper means companies who provide security trading services such as stocks, debts and trust fund for individual customers via internet line. Also, online securities industry means a group of those companies.
conducted on the internet, each company's products and services are shown in real time and some major companies disclose their corporate performance.
Therefore, the inducement to imitate a strategy that has succeeded in another company is relatively strong. In addition, as will be stated later, even
though there are problems with the information system, it is not very difficult to follow the strategy focuses on a company's internal elements (e.g., Kato & Aoshima, 2000) . Both explained the concept of differentiation among companies thoroughly and theoretically, however, there was little or nothing mentioned about the cause, process or mechanism of how such differentiation occurs. More specifically, the two views mentioned above have their limitations in that they are both statistical models.
This has led to an increased interest in a Dynamic
Capability-Based View of the Firm, which focuses on researching the dynamic process (e.g., Levinthal, 1995; Foss, 1997; Noda, 2001) , however, research based on this approach is still developing and there is a lack of available reference material.
In this situation, Noda and Collis (2001) attempted to build a universal framework to analyze the dynamic process. In their research, they showed a thorough framework, focusing on the strength of three forces: 1. Initial Conditions, which generate the seeds of differentiation among companies; 2.
Divergence Forces, which extend the differentiation;
3.
Convergence Forces, which counter differentiation and; Sustainability Conditions that prevent convergence and sustain differentiation. The researchers also studied the correlation of these components, in an attempt to build a strategic theory about the evolution of differentiation between companies in the same industry.
One company's success always invites
imitation by other companies and competitive differences among companies tend to decrease over time (Williams, 1994) . Today especially, with severe competition on a global scale, even core resources or competencies that are difficult to imitate, are likely to diffuse to other companies (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) . Nevertheless, their explanations of the mechanism of creating and maintaining differentiation can be said to be incomplete because of too much reliance on Coincidence and on the aspect of Initial Conditions.
On the other hand, current research is increasingly being based on the Action System Theory, which considers the dynamic process at an early stage of an industry as being the intended action of a number of players and as a combined process of these (e.g., Numagami, 2000) . Generally, many technologies and services are offered at the beginning of a market's formation, then emergence of the dominant design consolidates them (Abernathy, 1978) . The action system school of thought insists that it is also important to focus on Unintended Results, which are generated by the social and political interaction processes in the environment in which the company exists and not only on linear cause-and-result relationships, such as superior technology and service being the cause of market choice in this process. For example: "A company's persistence in core technology and preceding research in the United States" (Fukushima, 1999) ; "Technology policy of the government" (Shimamoto, 2001) and; "Technology performance presented at academic society" (Fujii, 2002) reported on those cases that are influenced largely by the innovation process and competition in the early stages of a market, after Unintended Results have occurred in consequence of the players' social interaction.
However, the major interest of that research was to clarify the logic behind what kind of interesting situation could occur in the innovation or competition process and to reinforce the probability of logic by using those cases, given that the environment surrounding a company (i.e., competition and technology) is not objective, but rather comprises actions by the players that influence each other. Therefore, the research question of this (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) , and; causal ambiguity, that is, the causes of superior company performance are not well understood (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982) . However, looking at the real world, these elements are not sufficient to explain a mechanism that sustains a competitive advantage over a long period.
Discussions have arisen to compensate for these unexplained elements and current research calls this
Isomorphism Power, based on the action system theory. Primarily, many strategic options compete with each other to obtain the limited resources in a company (Burgelman, 1991) . Therefore, in order to invest resource in line with the strategy, it is essential that legitimacy for this one strategy and not others be approved internally (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Kagono, 1988 Levitt and March (1988) , in which one company imitates another's behavior. That means that when one strategy has been adopted by a leading company or group of companies, even though the strategy turns out to be unreasonable afterwards, it is possible for it to become the dominant perception through the isomorphism process, just because the leading company has adopted it or because many companies do the same thing. Once this has happened, it becomes more and more difficult to secure legitimacy for strategic ideas that run against the dominant perception internally and an original strategy will be prevented (e.g., Fukushima, 1999) .
Moreover, once a company follows a dominant perception-based strategy with the isomorphism process, then various internal elements prevent a change in strategy. There are two major methods of organizational learning. One is Exploitation, which focuses on conventional routine work and the other is Exploration which focuses on a new routine that shows possibility. Usually, Exploitation has priority because it performs better (March, 1991) . On the other hand, when the external environment changes rapidly and significantly, like in the early stages of the market, a company should change learning away from Exploitation to Exploration to seek a new optimal routine. However, as people are used to the Exploitation way with its internal daily routine and their thoughts and behavior are fixed, they tend to take the familiar route and stick to conventional routines (Kagono, 1988; Levitt & March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982) . Furthermore, when conventional routine is thought to be a competitive resource or is connected to the political power of managers, resistance to change will be even larger and make it more difficult to adjust to the new environment (Leonard-Barton, 1992 in Japan began, which dramatically changed the competitive environment for online securities trading (Takai, 2004a (Takai, , 2005 . One of the first deregulation initiatives, introduced in December 1998, was the transition from a securities company licensing system to a registration system. This made it possible for many companies, including overseas companies and those from different industries, to enter the market more easily (Takai, 2004c) . The . Therefore, it is enough to pick up those six in terms of the influences on the industry. Also, it is common to deal with those six companies when writing about major companies in the industry. 5 Kabu.com Security was established by the merger of Nihon Online Security and E-wing Security in April 2004. Since the surveyed period in this paper covered more than half of the operation as Kabu.com, I used Kabu.com in this paper, not the former two companies. Note that Nihon Online Security entered when competition began, but the start of business was delayed from November 1999 to February 2000 due to a system failure (Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, 1999, November 7). However, accounts began to be offered from October 1999, so it can be treated as they took some part in the competition triggered by commission deregulation just like competitors (Nihon Kinyu Shimbun, 1999, September 22 Osaki (1999, p. 173 (1999, October 21) . 36 Number of accounts in 1999 from Saga (2000) . 37 The amount of stocks held by individuals was ¥100 trillion (6.4% of individuals' total assets) in Japan, whereas it was ¥ 860 trillion in the United States (24.2% of individual's total assets) (explanatory materials, After the strategy shift, those companies that had engaged in a fierce price competition found that their increase in the number of accounts stopped, but they experienced a favorable turnaround in business by following Matsui Securities' strategy. 43 In fact, 42 See Nikkei MJ (2000, September 25). 43 Following Matsui, initiation of combination of "margin trading" and "fixed commission fee", instead of number of accounts, decreased in absolute number and rate of increase, but profitability improved (Takai, 2004a, Figures 11 and 12) . Only Monex, who were late to follow, showed a dramatic fall in profit. E*trade, which had been the most pro-active price-cutting leader, admitted that they had improved their performance with the transition from the conventional strategy to a strategy of fixed commission fees and margin trading with small Monex showed an enormous increase in transaction amount (Takai, 2004a Because of this misunderstanding, even if they were left behind by Matsui Securities in terms of profit, which was not a major issue at that time, they didn't take it as a failure but rather a temporary phenomenon. Therefore, there was no necessity to imitate the strategy.
Of course, the effectiveness of the strategy that Nevertheless, the other companies continued to follow the dominant perception, which indicated that customers would increase dramatically and so these companies engaged in fierce competition, repeatedly cutting commissions whenever others did.
As stated before, it took no less than two years from the real rise of the market for the reality that However, by the time the change occurred, the gap However, once a Dominant Perception has been formed, most companies compete under it and accelerate competition in the wrong direction by interaction among companies. Therefore, differentiation among companies can be maintained for a much longer period than is normally the case.
Discussion
In this paper, we clarify the fact that the strategy of a successful company in the early stages of an industry may not be imitated for years, even in the situation where competitors know the strategy and its performance. So the validity of the strategy has been proved, because the Dominant Perception, to which many companies adhered, was strengthened.
This has enormous significance in the field of management strategy in providing the mechanism and the reasons why strategic imitation does not happen at once, even in an environment where information is so freely available, as it is today.
So, what is important: to exit ex-post unreasonable competition, as in the online securities industry, or not to get involved in the first place?
Firstly, the answer is that the top executive himself/herself tries to interpret information intentionally, not merely process it automatically as part of routine work (e.g., Kuwada & Tao, 1998) .
The original purpose of a work routine is to eliminate redundant information and data for efficient management, however, as a routine becomes entrenched information and data, which seem to be unrelated to the operation, are eliminated to a greater extent (Levitt & March, 1988) . However, if top executives can obtain rich information that has not been eliminated in a work processing routine and can interpret it correctly, it is possible that high level learning to modify the context and premises of existing behavior will be promoted (Kuwada, 1991) .
It has been suggested that the best way to interpret information as a rich experience is to take raw data in directly, which has not yet been processed in an existing information processing procedure, by repeating a small experiment (e.g., Itami & Kagono, 2003) . Thus, a company that accumulates information itself is thought to have a chance of exiting from irrational competition because it can judge the information from a market in alternative ways and proactively (Itami, 2004 ).
As stated above, in order for a top executive to interpret information as a rich experience, it is important to learn from other companies with a different approach to competition (Numagami, Asaba, Shintaku, & Amikura, 1992) . When one company succeeds with very unique strategic behavior, like Matsui did in the online securities industry, learning and watching the company carefully, gives the opportunity to expose one's own inertia, to be noticed and to examine the rules and premises of learning (Shintaku & Amikura, 1998) .
Using the unique strategy of another company as a reference to watch oneself comparatively, such as considering why that company behaved as it did, is necessary to get out of wrong homogeneous competition.
In Perception. We would like to build a more universal framework in future research.
